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Next Generation Nuclear Technologies: new challenges to the legal framework of the IAEA from Intense Neutron Sources

Matthias Englert* and Anne Harrington ** 
Abstract In this Chapter we take intense neutron sources (INS) as a somewhat futuristic case to unveil another dimension in disputes over the application of safeguards to nuclear technologies. The current IAEA safeguards regime is built on a distinction between facilities and materials. The assumption underlying such a distinction is that facilities are not a concern in the absence of nuclear materials. Historically, such a distinction made sense because there was no reason to operate nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the absence of nuclear materials. However, INS facilities do not require nuclear materials under normal operating procedures, yet they hold out the potential for producing weapons-grade plutonium in a shorter period of time and with less source material than existing facilities. As a result they present a new challenge to the IAEA safeguards regime. We present a comparison of the timeline to produce weapons-grade plutonium with reactors, spallation neutron sources and fusion plants, and discuss possible advantages and disadvantages of the respective technologies. One focus will be the possibility of fusion plants and spallation sources producing significant quantities of plutonium with less source material than ‘one effective kilogram’ of uranium. Furthermore the question will be raised if the corresponding technologies are adequately covered by current IAEA terms like ‘facility’ and ‘reactor’. 
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9.1	Introduction 
The legal framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to verify compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)​[1]​ by upholding a comprehensive regime of technical safeguards.  These technical measures are designed to ensure that no fissile material is diverted from a civilian energy program for military purposes. 
	Implicit in the design of the comprehensive safeguards regime is the assumption that facilities in and of themselves are not a proliferation threat until nuclear materials​[2]​ are introduced. However, this assumption does not necessarily hold true. The safeguards system was designed to verify declarations that specify how much nuclear material is present in a facility and in the nuclear fuel cycle as a whole.​[3]​ The underlying assumption is that if all nuclear material flows in the nuclear fuel cycle are known from cradle to grave and no nuclear materials cross state borders, a facility in and of itself will not pose a risk. However, historically the facilities in question, such as fission reactors, were not of much use without the introduction of nuclear materials. This will not necessarily be the case with new intense neutron sources (INS). Normal operating conditions at an INS facility will not require the presence of nuclear materials, which means that they will not be part of the traditional nuclear fuel cycle. 
INS is an umbrella term that the IAEA uses to describe technologies with a higher rate of flow of neutrons per area (neutron flux)​[4]​ than a fission reactor normally produces. INS covers spallation and fusion technologies. Common uses for spallation sources include research into the physical structure of materials and boosting fission reactors (accelerator driven systems). Like spallation sources, a common use for fusion reactors is research. Additionally, in the future they may become a more attractive nuclear energy source than fission reactors. 
In this Chapter we take intense neutron sources as a somewhat futuristic case to raise the question of whether the corresponding technologies are adequately covered by the current IAEA mandate and safeguards practices. We present a comparison of the timeline for producing plutonium with reactors, spallation neutron sources and fusion plants, and the possible advantages and disadvantages of the respective technologies. What this comparison reveals is that INS sources need much less nuclear material to produce ‘one effective kilogram’​[5]​ or a ‘significant quantity’​[6]​ of plutonium than fission reactors. Fusion reactors, in particular, have an exceptional capability to rapidly produce weapons grade plutonium. In spite of the fact that INS do not require nuclear materials under normal operating conditions, refining the operational capabilities of these facilities even in the absence of nuclear materials will produce tacit knowledge​[7]​ that could significantly reduce the timeline for a state that wants to breakout of the safeguards regime and produce a nuclear weapon. Therefore, they are covered under the IAEA’s verification mandate. However, the distinction between facilities and materials on which the comprehensive safeguards regime is built creates an exploitable gap in the safeguards regime into which INS facilities fall.
There are some who would agree with our conclusion that INS facilities are a proliferation concern, but still argue that there is no exploitable gap because the existence of an Additional Protocol (AP) safeguards agreement is sufficient to cover neutron sources. The AP model explicitly allows for the inspection not only of the correctness of a declaration, but also of a complete accounting of fissile materials. Therefore facilities in and of themselves would still not be a concern. Others point to an expansive interpretation of the completeness paradigm, the ‘state level approach, under which even standard Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA’s) accommodate completeness. Yet the fact remains that the safeguards regime is built around the presence of fissile materials, not the facilities in which they are processed and it is facilities that will increase the ambivalence inherent to nuclear programs by significantly reducing the timeline to produce fissile materials for a nuclear arsenal. 
Another common objection to the significance of the problem that intense neutron facilities present for IAEA safeguards is that the technology is not yet mature enough to warrant concern. The next step to the commercialization of fusion power is the successful operation of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Facility (ITER) in Cardarache France. Although ITER itself does not pose any serious proliferation risk as it is not capable of producing enough neutrons for a significant plutonium production, it will set precedencies for the development of the technology. Preventive measures to increase the proliferation resistance of the facility should be integrated in the design process e.g. by researching and developing safeguards by design. If ITER is successful, there are plans for nation states or international consortia similar to the ITER consortium to open several Demonstration Power Plants for operation in the 2030s. The demonstration phase is intended to develop commercial plants that will produce energy by 2050.​[8]​ 
Given this timeline, the future of the nuclear fusion power industry is not predictable today. It is too early to know whether or not fusion facilities will become commercially available to those states currently alleged to present a proliferation threat.​[9]​ However, that is not a reason to forego the opportunity to start planning for their incorporation into the safeguards system. It is precisely during the current design phase that there is the largest window of opportunity to shape the proliferation resistance of these facilities. Moreover, the problem of INS facilities opens a window onto the larger issue of how states are able to exploit the ambivalence of nuclear technology in order to trade on ‘latent’ or ‘virtual’ military capability in the context of negotiations over the status of their peaceful nuclear program. 
After having considered the specific case of INS facilities, the Chapter presents arguments for and against different options the IAEA may consider when deciding how to integrate INS into the existing safeguards regime. It concludes with a broader discussion of the limits of technical verification in the IAEA safeguards regime and the inherent ambivalence of nuclear technologies.  

9.2	Plutonium Producing Technologies
In this Section we compare the advantages and disadvantages of physical processes that breed plutonium in light of the IAEA safeguards regime. We consider dedicated fission reactors alongside fusion reactors and spallation neutron sources to assess the proliferation concerns associated with each type of facility.
In principle, all neutron sources are capable of producing fissile materials. The physical process that drives the reaction to produce plutonium is the capture of a neutron by the nucleus of a uranium atom yielding a plutonium atom after undergoing radioactive decay. Historically the production of plutonium for weapon purposes took place in dedicated fission reactors. However, there are several other physical processes that will be able to reach neutron fluxes as high as or higher than in a reactor, namely fusion and spallation. Criteria to compare the proliferation characteristics of these different technologies in terms of their underlying physical processes include: 
(a) The plutonium production rate. This is a measure of how much plutonium can be produced per unit time. The higher the production rate, the less time is required to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon (a significant quantity).
(b) The minimum amount of uranium required as source material to produce one significant quantity. The more uranium is needed the more difficult it will be to divert it to a weapons program
(c) The end concentration of plutonium isotopes in the heavy metal. The more plutonium is produced per mass of uranium (source material ​[10]​) the less chemical reprocessing is required to separate the plutonium from the uranium, transuranic elements and fission products.  
(d) The isotopic composition of the plutonium. The higher the percentage of the isotope Pu-239, the more attractive the material is for weapons purposes. 
These criteria will vary in these different processes depending on (1) the time under neutron irradiation, (2) the energy distribution of the neutrons in the materials (neutron spectrum), and (3) the neutron flux (rate of flow). We will show that once they are technically mature fusion reactors in particular will have advantages in producing large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium. 
The comparison offers two significant findings that should shape IAEA considerations of how to integrate INS facilities into the safeguards regime. First, fusion reactors have an exceptional capability for weapons-grade plutonium production. If they mature to industrial operation, this inherent potential renders them the optimal choice for quick production of large amounts of fuel for nuclear weapons. This latent capability would be relevant for states that want to quickly produce larger amounts of fissile material in the future. Second, fusion reactors have a very low source material requirement to produce a significant quantity of 8 kg weapons-grade plutonium.  No material is needed to maintain a fission chain reaction, so only several hundred kilograms of uranium or even depleted uranium would be sufficient. This is much less than the roughly 10 tons of uranium that would be required as source material to fuel the core of a fission reactor large enough for a similar plutonium production. Such an amount of uranium is the threshold in many IAEA protocols and definitions. Not only could less uranium be exempted from safeguards, but also it is no longer only natural uranium that poses a concern; in an INS depleted uranium could be used instead. Depleted uranium is widely available e.g. in conventional ammunition. Detecting the diversion of such low amounts of source material will be very challenging for a verification regime so that safeguards on the facility itself are even more important. 

9.2.1	Fission Reactors
In the early fissile material production programs the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China) commonly used graphite moderated fission reactors like the G1-Reactor at Marcoule in France or the N-Reactor at the Hanford site in the US.​[11]​ Heavy-water moderated fission reactors were used in the programs of NPT outliers Israel, India and Pakistan. Both reactor types have advantages for plutonium production compared to the light water moderated fission reactor (LWR), which is predominantly used in commercial energy production today. 
	Regardless of which fission reactor design is being used, the proper balance has to be struck between the quantity and quality of plutonium produced. The total production of plutonium in a fuel element (quantity) is inversely related to the attractiveness of the plutonium for weapon purposes (quality). The longer that uranium is exposed to neutrons in the reactor core, the more plutonium is produced. However, longer irradiation times lead to a buildup of heat producing plutonium isotopes (plutonium-238) or isotopes which undergo spontaneous fission reactions and release additional neutrons (plutonium-240, plutonium-242, plutonium-238). Beyond a certain threshold, neutrons from spontaneous fission might start the nuclear chain reaction too early when the bomb is triggered and together with the additional heat production would increase technical sophistication of the weapons design. Although all plutonium isotopes are weapon usable—it is only a matter of technical sophistication and know-how that determines if such plutonium can be used in a nuclear weapon—in order to maximize the quality of plutonium for weapons use, the exposure time has to be kept short. 
	In commercial operations with LWR it is not necessary to take into account the tradeoff between quality and quantity. Uranium fuel is used in a reactor as long as it is technically feasible regardless of the plutonium produced. The time is only constrained by safety considerations e.g. due to material fatigue and by the number of fissile atoms in the fuel that can still contribute to energy production.  At ‘end of life’, uranium fuel contains roughly 1% plutonium. Of that 1% more than 40% is the unwanted plutonium isotopes. In typical military production the uranium fuel contains a concentration of less than 0.1% plutonium, only one tenth of the plutonium in commercial spent fuel, but more than 93% of it is the attractive plutonium-239, perfect for weapon purposes. Due to the low concentrations of plutonium in the irradiated uranium fuel, larger amounts of uranium are necessary to produce a significant quantity of plutonium compared to a commercial operation.
	Total production rates for a sample of fission reactors are given in table 1.​[12]​  The table summarizes factors that influence the proliferation characteristics of a system for plutonium production. The total amount of plutonium that can be produced per year (PU rate), the weapons attractiveness of the produced plutonium (Burnup), the amount of uranium needed for the operation (Initial Uranium Loading), the final concentration of plutonium in the uranium (plutonium in fuel) and the size and technical sophistication, i.e. the cost of the system itself (power). 
For the low power reactors, like the French G-1 with about 40 Megawatt (MW) power, production rates of 11 kg plutonium-239 per year can be calculated for an initial uranium loading of roughly 100 tons.​[13]​ For an advanced production reactor like Hanford-N in the US with 4000 MW thermal power the production rate is significantly higher as the core contains much more fuel and is one hundred times more powerful. A commercial LWR will usually be operated to yield much higher burnups and the final plutonium concentration will be much higher. But high burnups will also increase the content of unwanted plutonium isotopes, so that the content of plutonium-239 will be well below 70%.  This in turn will demand a higher technical sophistication for a practical weapon design. 
	If the operation of a LWR is not optimized for commercial but for military purposes, the fuel elements will have to be exchanged more frequently to prevent the buildup of unwanted plutonium isotopes and get higher quality plutonium for weapon purposes. As constant refueling is not possible in an LWR​[14]​, the operating time and therefore the capacity per year would drop as a consequence to an estimated maximum of 60% or lower.​[15]​ 



Reactor	Power[MWth]	Burnup[GWd/t]	Initial Uraniumloading [t]  	Yearsin  Reactor core	Plutoniumin Fuel[kg/tHM]	ConversionRatio[g/MWd]	Pu Rate[kg/y]
PWR commercial	3000	30	100	3.4	8.5	0.3	250
PWR weapons	3000	1	100	0.15	~0.5	0.5	330
France G1	~40	0.2	100	1.7	0.2	0.95	11
Calder Hall	180	0.4	112	0.8	0.4	0.9	50
Hanford-N	4000	1.2	380	0.4	0.9	0.5	580
Yong-byon	~25	0.3	48	2.0	0.3	~0.9	7
Table 1: Comparison of different specifications for the production of plutonium with reactors. All reactor production rates calculated according to (Albright et al 1997) and for 80 % capacity factor (60 % for possible military use of an LWR.. Data for North Korean reactor Yong-byon see (Albright 1994)

These calculations give only a rough estimate. The real plutonium production in a LWR might be somewhat higher or lower, but for the purpose of this article we are not interested in the complexity of nuclear archeology​[16]​ and the estimates will be sufficient for comparison with other neutron producing technologies.

9.2.2	Spallation Neutron Sources 
In contrast to fission reactors spallation neutron sources (SNS) will be able to produce plutonium during operation once uranium is inserted, but do not require uranium under normal operating conditions and therefore are a challenge to the current safeguards regime. In an SNS, elementary particles like protons pick up speed in an accelerator by electromagnetic force.  When they hit a heavy metal target made of liquid lead or mercury, or possibly also uranium, they are traveling near the speed of light. The protons hit the atomic nuclei of the target and spall the nuclei in the process releasing a zoo of elementary particles and fractions of the nucleus together with several neutrons. 
A spallation neutron source (SNS) has two primary purposes. It is useful for research purposes (research-SNS), or as a driver for a subcritical reactor core in an accelerator driven system (ADS)—a machine that combines a subcritical reactor with a SNS for energy production. The SNS provides just enough neutrons so that the subcritical reactor multiplies the neutrons to produce energy. In contrast to a pure SNS without the additional reactor core an ADS will contain nuclear material under normal operating procedures and will be subject to IAEA safeguards just like a normal reactor.
	A first analysis of the proliferation potential of SNS, and more specifically ADS, can be found in (Magill 1999) and (Riendeau 1999).​[17]​ Such analysis was necessary as in the last decades SNS performance increased significantly.​[18]​ In particular, there is a renewed interest in SNS for research facilities and for industrial application e.g. accelerator transmutation of waste and ADS. Additionally, dynamics of accelerator development led to more sophisticated, smaller accelerators and there is a growing commercial market for accelerator technology and components. 
The power of a SNS directly depends on the proton beam current and energy. The technological developments of the last decades raised available currents from several 100 μA (Mikroampere) to several Milliampere today. Beam currents up to 100 mA for linear accelerators have been proven successfully. For the purpose of this assessment beam currents of 100 μA can be considered a conservative assumption, 1 mA a moderate and 10 mA progressive. 
	Calculations of research SNS show that possible plutonium production rates scale linearly with the beam current as well as with the beam energy.​[19]​ For SNS powers above 1 MW the achievable production rates are assessed to be comparable to a small fission reactor. The plutonium produced in a uranium target will be super weapons-grade plutonium with 99% plutonium-239 even after one year irradiation time. This means, in essence, that due to the neutron energy characteristics the quantity (total plutonium production) will have almost no influence on the quality (weapon attractiveness) of the produced plutonium, so that regardless of the irradiation time super-grade weapons plutonium will always be produced.

9.2.3	Fusion Power Plants 
Just like research-SNS, fusion power plants challenge the existing safeguards regime as they do not require uranium under normal operating conditions for the production of energy. But once uranium is inserted they have a potential to produce a significant quantity of weapons-grade plutonium in a small part of the reactor by diverting neutrons for this purpose in a concealed operation, or they could produce huge amounts of plutonium in a break-out scenario to fuel a quickly growing nuclear arsenal far exceeding production rates in a comparable fission reactor.
In the fusion reaction deuterium fuses with tritium yielding one Helium atom and a neutron with high energies. This energy is deposited in the structural materials of the fusion chamber, heating the chamber walls in the process.​[20]​ Large amounts of tritium will be used for the fusion reactions. Therefore the plasma chamber walls contain breeding blankets in which tritium is continuously reproduced by lithium atoms that capture neutrons. With this process the reactor provides its own fuel. 
	Due to the high neutron flux that deposits heat and breeds tritium, fusion power plants will have a remarkable potential to produce fissile materials during operation. One only has to insert uranium into the blankets to transmute it into plutonium. This is similar to the process that happens in fission reactor fuel, but in a pure fusion reactor fertile or fissile material is not used under normal operating conditions. This characteristic distinguishes it not only from fission reactors, but also from fusion-fission hybrid reactor concepts, which would contain fissile or fertile material either to produce even more energy or to produce plutonium to fuel a satellite fleet of fast reactors.​[21]​ The idea of fusion-fission hybrids is discussed since fusion research started. However, currently most conceptual studies of a future power plant only consider a pure fusion facility.​[22]​ 
Five technical reasons are decisive for why a fusion power plant would be attractive for a proliferator:
(1) High plutonium production potential. We calculated plutonium production rates in fusion power plants using the conceptual design of a magnetic confinement fusion power plant (tokamak)​[23]​ published by the European Fusion Development Agency (EFDA) in 2006.​[24]​ We reproduce some results (table 2) without the details of the underlying assumptions. Under normal operation the blankets in the reactor chamber walls are used for tritium production and filled with a liquid Lead-Lithium (Pb-17Li) alloy. To calculate possible plutonium production rates we added one percent of natural uranium to the alloy in our ‘monte carlo’ computer model. 
	Table 2 shows two exemplary operations of a much broader parametric study. One of the blankets close to the plasma (2 cm) alone filled with 220 kg of uranium would yield 4 kg weapons-grade plutonium per year. That is half of a significant quantity needed for one bomb according to the IAEA and such plutonium production is comparable to a small fission reactor.
	Other blankets will be further away from the plasma and produce less plutonium as less neutrons will travel that far. But using more than one blanket would have a cumulative effect and much higher production rates could be achievable. In total this reactor contains some 189 breeding blankets with different volumes. The blankets are closer or farther away from the plasma. If all were filled with 1% uranium the whole reactor could produce more than a ton of weapon-grade plutonium per year. Although technically challenging, this potential exceeds anything we know from the world of fission reactors. ​[25]​ 
 
Fusion reactor	Mass[t]	Yearsin Blanket	Conc. Bl.[kg/tHM]	Pu Rate[kg/y]
One Blanket	0.22	1	21	4
Complete Reactor	11.8	1	Var.	1300
Table 2 Plutonium production in a fusion reactor.

(2) Extremely low source material requirements. If used for military purposes another main advantage over fission reactors would be a relatively small requirement of source material (natural or  depleted uranium).​[26]​ Even with masses much lower than 1 t natural (or even depleted) uranium, plutonium production rates on the order of kilograms are possible. The minimum amount of natural uranium​[27]​ necessary to operate a small fission reactor is roughly 10t of natural uranium. 
(3) High end concentrations of plutonium. Additionally, the achievable concentration of plutonium in the uranium can be much higher than in a fission reactor, reducing the requirements for the uranium mass that has to be irradiated with neutrons. Such a high plutonium concentration in the uranium is also advantageous for reprocessing campaigns to extract plutonium from the uranium breeding targets. 
(4) Plutonium is always weapons-grade. Due to the hard neutron flux in a fusion reactor Pu-239 fractions and hence the weapon usability are typically higher than in fission reactors of comparable power. The isotopic composition will contain more than 90% plutonium-239 even for extremely high burnup. So the plutonium produced will be always weapons quality. 
 	There is a fifth proliferation concern associated with fission reactors that is not directly related to the four underlying physical properties associated with plutonium production. That is the use of tritium in a fusion reactor. Tritium is under export control in some countries but not part of the safeguards architecture. However, tritium is used in advanced weapon designs to boost the fission reaction with additional neutrons and enhance the efficiency of a weapon. This reduces the mass of fissile material needed to achieve a certain weapon yield. Tritium boosting is considered as one of the important steps in weapon design to minimize the size of a warhead that it is usable on e.g. a missile. Typically only several grams of tritium are sufficient for boosting. In a large fusion power plant several kilograms will be in the inventory and the annual production rate well beyond 100 kg.​[28]​ 

9.2.4	Potential Proliferation Concerns 

On the basis of all four of the relevant physical criteria listed above, either research SNS or fusion reactors promise to provide advantages over fission reactors for potential proliferators. First, in the case of fusion plants the total plutonium production rate could exceed that of a fission reactor. (This does not apply to research SNS.) Second, both fusion and research SNS require a relatively low initial mass of natural or even depleted uranium to produce a significant quantity of plutonium (in a research SNS or a fusion reactor there is no need to keep up criticality like in the early production reactors), a fact that poses a problem for safeguards if the minimum threshold for verification of INS as a ‘facility’ under comprehensive safeguards agreements is one effective kilogram. Third, the possibility of achieving high concentrations in the material without reducing the Pu-239 content in the isotopic composition means that research SNS and fusion reactors will require less chemical reprocessing to separate the plutonium from the uranium, transuranic elements and fission products. Fourth, even for high burnup, the weapon usability is high with much higher plutonium-239 fractions than in fission reactors. The total irradiation time for both INS technologies is only limited by the radiation and thermal stress of the target material.

9.3	Is There an Exploitable Gap?
In the previous section we compared the main technical advantages of research SNS and a fusion plant to the production of plutonium in a fission reactor. In this section we argue that the findings from our comparison point toward the need to focus on facilities, rather than merely on nuclear material and how it is flowing through the nuclear fuel cycle. Research SNS and fusion reactors are a different type of proliferation challenge than fission reactors because they carry military potential, yet none of the materials used under normal operating conditions are subject to the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty. Therefore, although INS are covered by the verification mandate of the IAEA, the conditions under which they are subject to specific safeguards requirements remain underspecified. 
The IAEA is well aware that INS have the potential for military use and is collecting data on the specifics of accelerators, spallation neutron sources and fusion plants. In 2014, the IAEA convened a consultancy group on Non-Proliferation Challenges in Connection with Magnetic Fusion Power Plants, in which Dr. Englert, one of the authors of this paper, took part. The consultancy group agreed that the IAEA has a mandate to address the issue of INS. That mandate derives its legitimacy from Article IV of the NPT and the IAEA Statute.​[29]​ Furthermore, the group recommended that a regular verification process would be needed to ensure that fusion reactors are not used for military purposes. However, the group did not specify how INS should be integrated into the IAEA verification regime, only that it would become necessary to do so.​[30]​ 
The question of whether or not existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with their materials-based approach are sufficient to encompass regular verification procedures at INS facilities is not one of legitimacy, but rather of scope and frequency. The argument for why existing CSAs are sufficient depends upon a broad-scope interpretation of the IAEA’s mandate known as the ‘state level approach.’ This ‘holistic’ approach to safeguards screens the nuclear program of a state in its entirety. Unlike traditional interpretations of the comprehensive safeguards regime, which construed the task of the IAEA narrowly to be the verification of the correctness of a state’s declarations, this broad interpretation adds to correctness the demand of completeness, meaning that the IAEA also has the ability to undertake inspections of suspicious activities in order to confirm that a state has declared all material flows in compliance with its reporting requirements.​[31]​ 
Arguments that the state level approach provides for regular inspections of INS facilities are particularly effective in cases where a state has agreed to supplement its CSA with an Additional Protocol (AP). The AP makes explicit the fact that IAEA inspectors may visit, not only declared facilities, but also locations outside of facilities.​[32]​  
There are, however, differing opinions on whether the state-level approach might be sufficient to provide timely warning of a military use of INS. Regular verification similar to safeguards, including inspections, might be needed, to verify the absence of fissile material and to detect a missing declaration of the use of uranium in such a facility. The consultancy group on fusion recommended to that end that it would be “advantageous to include fusion in existing verification regimes” and that the IAEA should provide guidance on those issues.​[33]​ Even so, the conclusion of the consultancy group pointed to the difficulty of covering facilities with agreements drafted with material flows in mind:
[c]urrent verification frameworks are based on the assumption that nuclear materials are used in any facility that requires verification, following the logic of the material flows in the various possible fission systems. The design flow and/or inventory of source or special fissionable material is also used to determine the frequency of inspections.​[34]​ 

While it may be possible to accommodate INS facilities under existing agreements in principle, in practice the focus on material flows opens up an exploitable gap in the regulatory framework that states can use to contest legitimate access, and what does and does not constitute non-compliance with CSA and AP requirements. 
There are two features of this gap. First, the fact that fusion reactors would require far less uranium than envisioned by the current standard for ‘one effective kilogram’ and second INS facilities are not covered by the current definition of ‘facility.’ Neither the materials centric framework of CSAs nor the relative silence of the AP on the frequency or duration of inspections at locations outside facilities, makes explicit the regularity with which access to INS facilities would be required in order to verify that uranium had not been introduced. 

9.3.1 Plutonium Production with Less than One Effective Kilogram 
Nearly every state party to the NPT has a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.​[35]​ Safeguards are applied without exception when any nuclear material 
of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the State […].​[36]​ 

The CSA document also specifies that all materials that contain uranium or thorium have to be reported to the IAEA if these materials are exported from or imported in a Non-Nuclear Weapon State, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes. For such material it is sufficient to specify the composition and quantity, and the destination in case of an export. 
As noted above, amounts far less than one effective kilogram​[37]​ of uranium are sufficient for significant plutonium production in a fusion reactor: 
(A) At the request of the Non-Nuclear Weapon State, one effective kilogram can be exempted from safeguards. This includes ten tons in total of natural uranium, ten tons depleted uranium (>0.5% enrichment) or 20 tons (<0.5% enrichment) according to the standard definition of one effective kilogram. ​[38]​  It is also unclear in the definitions what exactly is termed to be a non-nuclear purpose or ‘non-nuclear activity’. Construction and operation of an SNS in the U.S. e.g. is not a nuclear activity since the term ‘atomic energy’ in the Atomic Energy Act statutory definition limits the definition to energy released in fission and fusion.​[39]​
(B) Even depleted uranium can be used and is widely available in small quantities such as in ammunition.​[40]​ It would be extremely challenging to account for depleted uranium amounts with such a precision, that a diversion would be detected in a timely manner. The situation is comparable to the challenge of Material Unaccounted For (MUF) in larger fuel cycle facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants: the precision to reduce the error bar of MUF increases costs, and a balance between efficiency and effectiveness has to be chosen to fulfill the objective of safeguards (INFCIRC/153, para. 28): the credible deterrence of diversion.
(C) Current inspection frequencies are not adequate. In the CSA inspection frequencies are specified according to the amount of effective kilograms used in such a facility, 
in the case of facilities […] with a content or annual throughput whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms routine inspections shall not exceed one per year.​[41]​ 

This is not sufficient for timely detection in the light of the potential plutonium production rates. Reactors e.g. have a maximum of 50 days in which one Inspector can be On-Site at one facility (INFCIRC/153, para. 80.a.).​[42]​
	
9.3.2 Definition of a Facility
The IAEA should receive declarations about the ‘facilities’ in a country. The IAEA defines a ‘facility’ as: 
a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or 
b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.​[43]​ 

Neither spallation nor fusion facilities would fall under the term ‘facility’, as they are neither reactors​[44]​ nor critical facilities nor locations where nuclear material in quantities more than one effective kilogram is customarily used. In a pure fusion reactor no nuclear material at all should be present at the site at any time by design.
	One could argue through backward reasoning that a fusion plant (or a research SNS) would fall under the IAEA definition of a ‘facility’ and thus should be considered for inspection as its operation might involve a potential production of more than one effective kilogram of plutonium. To verify the absence of actual production the IAEA needs to inspect the facility regularly. Such an understanding of the wording of INFCIRC/153 (‘customarily used’) would interpret ‘use’ modally (possible, contingent) and not factually and expand the scope of the inspection mandate to a new category of facilities. Such an interpretation would also be along the line of a completeness paradigm that certifies the absence of nuclear material at a site because before absence is an empiric fact it is a possible presence and invokes inspection given some rationally deductible clues for suspision. However the fact remains that INS, are usually not associated with the ‘customary use’ of more than one effective kilogram of nuclear material. 
The current definitions of facilities are inadequate as they do not intergrate the neutron producing capacity of INS. The best way to trigger safeguards would be to not only specify facilities by the presence of nuclear material under normal operation but also directly in terms of fissile material production capacities – in case of INS that would be plutonium production capacity. The old facility specific safeguards (INFCIRC/66) and the Additional Protocol e.g. specify an annual production rate of 100 g plutonium per year as a threshold. Quantitative proxies for plutonium production could be also the neutron flux or the thermal power of a system.​[45]​ 

9.4	Legal Challenges and the Limits of Technical Verification 
There is a relatively straightforward fix to close both of the gaps identified in the previous section. Updating the definition of a ‘facility’ to include quantified parameters that describe a latent fissile material production capability would close the gap created by a materials-based definition of a facility by specifying a certain threshold that would trigger regular safeguards for a timely detection of such a use. This solution would clarify the right of the IAEA to continuously verify the absence of nuclear material, effectively also closing the gap created by the fact that an INS facility would require less than one effective kilogram of uranium to produce a significant quantity of weapons grade plutonium. 
What this straightforward solution does not resolve is the fact that verifying the absence of nuclear materials does not preclude the military potential of the facility. Nuclear facilities are not simply ‘dual-use’. Describing facilities as dual-use falsely ascribes an either/or characteristic to the technology. Such a characterization implies that it is possible to separate the uses and to guarantee that utilizing the facility for one purpose precludes its simultaneous use for the other. Dual-use is not a property of the technology, but rather an ideal that the safeguards regime is designed to achieve. 
Pointing out the fiction of dual-use as an either/or choice between civilian and military purposes is not a new observation. Scholars have been talking about the problem of ‘threshold states’ and ‘latent nuclear arsenals’ since at least the 1970’s. In 1976 Thomas Schelling, for instance, argued that: 
Until recently, having or not having nuclear weapons appeared to be, and was treated as, a question of yes or no. From now on it will make more sense to describe a country's nuclear-weapon status not with a yes or a no but with a time schedule. The answer will be a chart, giving the number of weapons of certain energy yields and certain physical characteristics that could be available after elapsed hours, days or weeks from the decisions to assemble them.​[46]​
What Schelling describes in this passage is not a world in which there are nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”, but rather one in which the ability to manufacture nuclear materials locates non-nuclear weapon states along an ambiguous continuum. These states are what Mohamed ElBaradei and others have described as ‘virtual nuclear-weapon States.’​[47]​ Virtual nuclear weapons states have the know-how, experts, materials and facilities so that they come close to the civil-military boundary. ElBaradei considered as many as 40 states as virtual nuclear-weapon states with latent capabilities. These States are in possession of - in our terminology - ambivalent nuclear technology and know-how. The must obvious ones are Japan, Germany, South Korea, Iran but also others less obvious ones like Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil etc. have a history of using the ambivalent potentiality of nuclear technologies and politicizing them for other gains
The timeline to having a nuclear weapon that Schelling envisions is more politically salient than ever today. Yet, the language we use to describe this dynamic remains unrefined. Wolfgang Liebert and Itty Abraham separately have both suggested that a more accurate descriptor for nuclear technology than dual-use is ambivalent​[48]​, meaning that the uses of nuclear technology are simultaneous and contradictory by nature. The technology always carries both potentialities and they are realized in context at any one moment in time. Negatively, the intrinsic ambivalent characteristics of nuclear technologies undermine the civil-military boundaries and jeopardize the careful work done by state governments, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations to carefully draw a line between the two. Positively, the ambivalence of nuclear technology makes it possible for different actors to read contradictory interpretations onto the same materials and facilities. It opens a space for politics.
Ambivalence plays an important political role in nonproliferation agreements. As is often said, negotiation is the art of “removing the brackets” by which diplomats mean that there is a process by which disagreements about the language of an agreement is slowly resolved by reconciling differences. The fact that nuclear technology is inherently ambivalent allows diplomats to ratchet down the language, making it ever more rigid and specified. At the same time, everyone knows that the technology carries another possibility within it. Ambivalent technology functions like a pressure release valve within the rigid ‘have’ and ‘have not’ NPT system. 
Arguably, manipulating the ambivalence of nuclear technology in order to circumvent, or at least challenge, the boundaries of the NPT is what Iran has been doing in the negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (US, Russia, China, France, Great Britain) plus Germany (P5+1). The success of the negotiations for the P5+1 is measured in terms of their ability to extend the Iranian timeline to having enough enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium for a bomb. Although we have cast the exploitable gap created by a materials-based approach as a somewhat futurist case study with INS at its center, a similar dynamic is at work in the Iranian nuclear strategy today.
Uranium enrichment plants clearly fall under CSAs since they use natural uranium and produce low enriched uranium.  But what happens if the gas centrifuges in the uranium enrichment plant are not fed with uranium but stay under vacuum or enrich the isotopes of elements other than uranium? This might be the outcome for the fortified underground uranium enrichment site at Fordow, Iran. As of the writing of this chapter, under a negotiated settlement Fordow would be converted to a nuclear research center with a maximum of 1000 centrifuges which would not be fed with uranium. (The difference between INS and a nuclear-material-free Fordow plant, however, is that Fordow is still a facility under CSA as it is an enrichment plant and that it could not produce a significant quantity with less than one effective kilogram of source material.)​[49]​ In order for this solution to work, it will be necessary to identify what kind of research the plant will be useful for achieving.​[50]​ In other words, as it now stands at the end of April 2015 a successful deal between the P5+1 and Iran hinges on accentuating the inherent ambivalence of nuclear technology, so much so that there is a need to create ambiguity by repurposing a uranium enrichment facility so that it will not require uranium under normal operating conditions.
Interestingly, enhancing the ambivalence of the Fordow enrichment facility may become one of the cornerstones of the negotiated settlement that would close the gap in the definition of a facility. Iran first began exploiting this gap more than a decade ago by repeatedly constructing, but not immediately disclosing, uranium enrichment facilities. Whether or not Iran has therefore violated its obligations to the IAEA has been a key point of contention throughout the conflict. 
According to Code 3.1. in the subsidiary agreement to the CSA between Iran and the IAEA. Such subsidiary agreements  
shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in the Agreement are to be applied.​[51]​ 

Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new facilities ‘normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time’.​[52]​ 
Before the Iranian program was even disclosed the IAEA wanted to change this policy to allow for more time to verify the design information of such complex facilities as enrichment or reprocessing plants, arguing that, ‘[t]he modified text agreed to in 2003, […] provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier’.​[53]​ In 2007 Iran, however, informed the IAEA that it wanted to return to the old specification of code 3.1. with the 180 days of advanced notice to the IAEA. Then in 2009 the existence of the Fordow plant was disclosed to the IAEA and caused a dispute if Iran was in compliance with its obligations.
Apart from the legal question of whether or not these subsidiary agreements constitute a treaty and could be changed unilaterally, as Iran claimed, or not as the IAEA legal advisers argue,​[54]​ a position later affirmed by the Security Council Resolution 1929. The fact is that Iran contested the agreed boundaries. Iran did so by pointing at a loophole in the system: when exactly a latent capability needs to be disclosed to the IAEA. Beyond the issue of sufficient time to verify a facility design, the similarity between INS and facilities under code 3.1. in subsidiary agreements to the CSA before 2003 is the ambivalent status of when exactly a facility turns into a facility.
The Iranian example illustrates how nuclear technologies can be used to transgress boundaries. Verification is intended to ensure timely detection of such transgressions and deter actors. What verification does not do is reduce ambivalence. Specifying verification rules under agreements with the intent of reducing and quantifying uncertainty is important not only to detect transgressions but also to have the legal means to enforce compliance. However, politically, once a boundary is specified, the boundary itself can offer leverage as a point of resistance. 
From this perspective, the term ambivalence captures the tension between the safeguards regime and the technology it is designed to regulate, a tension that the redefinition of the term ‘facilities’ to integrate INS will not resolve. The larger problem of technical verification is an over reliance on scientific verification techniques in an effort to eliminate ambivalence by replacing it with the certainty of objectivity. INS highlight this as they even allow to exert a clear-cut criterion for safeguard purposes as detecting any nuclear materials or products from fission processes in a ‘pure’ plant would immediately raise suspicion unless the facility was designed for such a use (fusion-fission hybrid or an uranium target in a research SNS). The technical implementation of instrumentation and measurement devices in a pure INS plant would also be relatively simple compared to the complexity of material flows in other fuel cycle facilities. Paradoxically, closing the current legal gaps to safeguard these facilities is a logical step, but rather than being a solution it only highlights the problem - much like a bandage that temporarily fixes and simultaneously points to the underlying issue – the limit of technical verification.  

9.6	Conclusions
As all neutron sources are capable in principal of producing fissile materials like plutonium, in this paper we compared reactors with intense neutron sources regarding the potential to produce fissile material. Possible advantages and disadvantages of the respective technologies with their completely different underlying physical processes were discussed. In research SNS and fusion facilities high concentrations of plutonium can be bred thus reducing the amount of source material necessary for production. Even with amounts well below one effective kilogram, which can be exempt from safeguards, significant production of weapon grade plutonium is possible.  Fusion reactors have in addition the capacity to produce huge amounts of plutonium. 
Today, there is no immediate proliferation concern with regard to SNS and fusion, as both technologies are currently not yet widely used or in the case of fusion, development for commercial application will take another 20-30 years. However, research and implementation of preventive technical mechanisms to enhance the proliferation resistance by developing safeguard procedures and by finding, if applicable, proliferation resistant designs should be integral part of the technological progress as early as possible. 
	Intense neutron sources are currently not directly covered by the IAEA regulatory practice. However the physical attributes of those machines to produce fissile material raise a number of questions about the legitimacy and scope of the different IAEA mechanisms to separate military and civil use of nuclear technologies and about the strategies of potential proliferators. Intense neutron sources challenge the regime built around accounting for the presence of fissile materials, as opposed to a broader view of nuclear-capable technologies more generally. Unlike existing nuclear energy reactors, intense neutron sources do not require nuclear materials to produce energy.
	We identified possible gaps in the current definitions of the IAEA e.g. what defines ‘one effective kilogram’, or in the current IAEA terminology of what constitutes a ‘facility’. Some of the issues could be addressed under the broader mandate of the Additional Protocol e.g. by complementary inspection authority, but regular inspections similar to those under the standard protocol INFCIRC/153 are needed. In any case, the current focus on existing nuclear material and the loophole on production potentials of facilities will need some legal amendment and clarification on the long run. We argued that rather than focusing on the presence of fissile material in a facility alone the definition of a ‘facility’ should include quantified parameters that describe a latent fissile material production capability (‘virtual’ fissile materials). 
Although military potentiality is a common feature in nuclear technologies like reactors or enrichment and reprocessing plants, INS and especially fusion plants highlight military potentiality due to their operability without nuclear materials. Even if legal fixes and technical measures were applied to close current loopholes by verifying the absence of nuclear material, INS facilities and especially fusion plants will remain attractive for a proliferator due to their exceptional latent characteristics to produce large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium quickly with low source material requirements. 
Rather from being a purely abstract point the latent use of nuclear potentialities is at work in the Iranian nuclear strategy today and will become an even bigger issue in the future. Technical verification and its legal implementation in institutional arrangements or treaties like safeguards agreements is and will remain important to reduce uncertainties and refine early detection of military uses. But it will not eradicate the ambivalent nature of nuclear technologies. In consequence ‘the emphasis has to shift from physical denial and technological secrecy to the things that determine incentives and motivations and expectation.’​[55]​ The question is not ‘how do we prevent cheating?’ but rather how do the mechanisms of denial structure incentives for a state that have a desire to resist through proliferation: ‘how do safeguards shape motivations?’.
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^1	   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161.
^2	  ‘Nuclear Material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute’ (INFCIRC/153). ‘The term source material means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine’ (IAEA statute). The term special fissionable material means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term special fissionable material does not include source material.
^3	  Design documents of the facility and their correctness are also important to verify that no fissile material diversion could take place. 
^4	  The technical term is neutron flux: the distance all neutrons travel through a certain volume in a specific time. The higher the flux the higher the reaction rate for a specific reaction of neutrons with the nucleus of other atoms in the material. These processes can be fission, capture, scattering and others. A helpful visualization is the billiard table. 
^5	  See below n 37.
^6	  ‘The approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded’ (IAEA 2001). A significant quantity (SQ) of direct use nuclear material is 8 kg of plutonium containing less than 80% plutonium-238, 25 kg of highly enriched uranium with enrichment higher than 20% in uranium-235. For indirect nuclear use material it is 75 kg uranium-235, the amount that is roughly contained in 10t of natural uranium or 20t of depleted uranium (see also the definition of one effective kilogram below n.37). Other isotopes are 8 kg of uranium-233 and 20t of thorium.
^7	  MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995, at 45.
^8	  EFDA 2012.
^9	  A more detailed argumentation under what political and technological conditions fusion energy could become proliferation relevant with regard to a widespread use in the energy mix of certain countries in the future can be found in Franscheschini et al 2013. 
^10	  See n. 2.
^11	  Modern light water reactors slow down the neutrons to low energies by using light water as moderator.  Neutrons released by atomic fission events are very fast (high energy), but to induce further fissions in other fissile atoms (chain reaction) it is advantageous to slow them down (moderate them) to lower energies. A process that is also called thermalization if the neutrons are slowed down to the ambient temperatures of thermal reactors. In fast reactors the neutrons are not slowed down as much. The use of different moderators (graphite, light water, heavy water) allows to influence the energy distribution (speed distribution) of the neutrons on a reactor core to tailor this distribution to the processes that would gain from it.
^12	  The production rates were calculated using conversion factors for plutonium production and using the nominal thermal power of the reactors. See Albright et al 1997, Annex A.
^13	  Albright et al 1997, chapter 3.
^14	  To operate such reactors the primary cooling loop has to be closed and the reactor vessel sealed. 
^15	  For the proliferation concerns associated with light water reactors, cf. Gilinsky et al 2004.
^16	  Fetter 1993; IPFM 2009.
^17	  (Magill and Peerani 1999) also mentions several programs set up since the 1950s which were dedicated to investigate electronuclear fissile material production.
^18	  See Bauer 2001, Fig.13, at 520.
^19	  This applies for energies above ~ 300 MeV. There are also limits to the total production due to technical constraints of heat removal, accelerator current and accelerator reliability. See Englert et al 2006, Englert 2009, Englert and Liebert 2010a.  
^20	  There are two technical approaches to commercialize fusion, one is magnetic confinement fusion the other inertial confinement fusion. In Magnetic confinement fusion a plasma of deuterium and tritium will be heated to extreme temperatures so that the atoms will hit each other and fuse together. The plasma chamber is formed like a torus (donut) and very strong magnetic fields will keep the plasma from touching the wall. In inertial confinement fusion, large laser beams will compress a small deuterium-tritium pellet in one laser shot, and thereby fuse the atoms. In this article we only consider magnetic confinement fusion. For proliferation concerns of inertial confinement fusion see Goldston and Glaser 2011.
^21	  Bethe 1979, Holdren 1981.
^22	  China and India still show interest in fusion-fission hybrid reactor devlopment. Recently there is new interest in such reactor concepts (Freidberg and Kadak 2009, Gerstner 2009). Proliferation risks associated with fusion power plants are discussed in Holdren et al. 1989, Raeder 1995, Cook et al. 2001, Faghihi et al 2008, Sievert and Johnson 2010, Goldston 2011, Glaser and Goldston 2012, Franceschini et al 2013, Franceschini and Englert 2013, IAEA 2014.
^23	  Term is a transliteration from the Russian acronym. In english it would be TOroidal CHAmber with MAgnetic Coils (tochamac).
^24	  Maisonnier et al 2005. Detailed calculations and discussions of results are published in Englert 2009, Englert and Liebert 2010, Englert et al 2010, Englert et al 2011, Englert et al 2014.  
^25	  As for the case of spallation these calculations are only rough estimates under several simplifying assumption which are described in (Englert 2009, Englert et al 2010) in greater detail.  For restrictions on the amount of uranium in such a plant see the literature referenced above. Also parts of the plant, especially the breeding blankets would have to be converted to accommodate uranium without jeopardizing their other functions. Such changes will give an inspector leverage to detect any unusual uses in a fusion plant.   
^26	  Since fusion reactors and SNS – unlike fission reactors – do not require critical masses of uranium, these uranium insertions can be arbitrarily small. Natural uranium consists of two different isotopes uranium-235 and uranium-238. Only uranium-238 contributes to the fission chain reaction in a typical light water reactor for power production. Since natural uranium only has a fraction of 0.7% uranium-235 with the remaining 99.3% being uranium-238, the fraction of uranium-235 has to be increased by enrichment to roughly 3-5% for use in light water reactors. As a waste stream the enrichment process also produces depleted uranium with a uranium-235 content below the natural enrichment.
^27	  Or the natural uranium equivalent in case such a reactor operates with enriched fuel.
^28	  More on the proliferation impact of tritium can be found in (Kalinowski and Colschen1995, Kalinowski 2004). 
^29	  Article II: ‘The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.’Article III.5: ‘The Agency is authorized: […] To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.’It has to be noted that ‘atomic energy’ does not necessarily include all physical processes that emit neutrons. E.g. in the US ‘atomic energy’ in the Atomic Energy Act statutory definition limits the definition to energy released in fission and fusion not spallation, which would be a non-nuclear activity according to such a logic.
^30	  IAEA 2014.
^31	  For the discussion on completeness and correctness see above Chapters 2 ‘The General Framework of IAEA Safeguards’ (Tariq Rauf); 3 (Interpretation of Nuclear Safeguards Commitments: the role of subsequent agreements and practice (Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont); 4 ‘Verification of Correctness and Completeness in the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards: the law and practice (Laura Rockwood and Larry Johnson); 5 ‘The NPT and the IAEA Additional Protocol (Masahiko Asada); and 8 ‘Technical Limits of Verification and Their Implications for Treaty Design (Gerald Kirchner and Stefan Oeter).
^32	  Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less. INFCIRC/540
^33	  IAEA 2014.
^34	  IAEA 2014.
^35	  International Atomic Energy Agency: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), 1972, para. 28.
^36	  Ibid.
^37	  Effective kilogram (ekg): (a) for plutonium , its weight in kilograms (1 kg plutonium is 1 effective kilogram). (b) For uranium with enrichment of 1% and above, its weight in kilogram is multiplied by the square of its enrichment (e.g. 25 kg 20% low enriched uranium is 1 effective kilogram). (c) For uranium enriched to 0.5-1% its weight in kilogram multiplied by 0.0001 (10t uranium is 1 effective kilogram),  (c) for depleted uranium with and enrichment of 0.5% or below, and for thorium , its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005 (20 t uranium or thorium is 1 effective kilogram). para. 104 of INFCIRC/153.
^38	  The definition of the “Consolidated Trigger List” of the Zangger Committees (INFCIRC/209, Rev. 2) exempts only 50g plutonium from declaration for import and export.In the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (INFCIRC/255 Rev.3) three categories (I-III) are applied based on masses requiring different protection measures: For unirradiated plutonium: category I: > 2 kg, category II: >500g, category III > 15g. For uranium with >20% enrichment I: >5 kg, II: > 1 kg, III: >15g. For uranium with 10-20% enrichment I: --, II: > 10 kg, III: 1-10 kg. For uranium with <10% enrichment I: --, II: --, III: >10 kg. For uranium-233 I: > 2 kg, II: >500 g, III: >15 g. 
^39	  Thanks to David Moses, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, for this and several other arguments in this section.
^40	  E.g. a 25 mm uranium projectile contains 200 g depleted uranium. A 120 mm armor-piercing penetrator as it used on Abrams tanks contains 4.5 kg. Depleted uranium ammunition is used by several countries worldwide.
^41	  International Atomic Energy Agency: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), 1972, para. 28.
^42	  For facilities containing more than 5 effective kilogram (ekg) those involving enriched uranium (>5%) and plutonium, it is 30 times the square root of one ekg, (30*Sqrt[ekg]), for all other facilities it is (0.4*ekg).
^43	  International Atomic Energy Agency: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), 1972, para. 28.
^44	  The definition of a reactor is specified in the IAEA glossary according to the definition in the older facility specific safeguards (INFCIRC/66) and is based on the terms fission and chain reaction. ‘Reactor' means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained (INFCIRC/66). Facility specific safeguards according to INFCIRC/66 were replaced by the comprehensive safeguards INFCIRC/153 and exist for only few facilities in countries outside the NPT regime. The IAEA glossary contains the following definition. ‘Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction’ (IAEA 2001). References to the term reactor in the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which is not ratified yet by all Members of the NPT, is also based on this terminology. Article 1.1. of Annex II lists specified equipment for reporting of exports and imports: ‘Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.’ The explanatory note provides: ‘A nuclear reactor basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core. It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as `zero energy reactors.’
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